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SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC. V. MEMBERS OF THE NEW YORK CRIME
VICTIMS BOARD, 112 S. CT. 501 (1991).
Simon & Schuster sued the New York State Crime Victims
Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking an order declaring that New
York's "Son of Sam" statute violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. This statute, enacted in reaction to the serial killer
David Berkowitz's plans to profit from his infamy, mandates that
an accused or convicted criminal's income from works mentioning
his or her crime be deposited in an escrow account by the con-
tracting publishing company. These funds are then made available
to victims of the crime and to the criminal's other creditors. In this
particular action, Simon & Schuster had just signed an agreement
with an author who had obtained the rights to write a book about
the life of organized crime figure Henry Hill. The Crime Victims
Board alleged that Simon & Schuster had violated the Son of Sam
Law, and ordered it to turn over all money payable to Hill. Simon
& Schuster then brought suit. The district court found for the
Crime Victims Board and Simon & Schuster appealed. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision in
favor of the Crime Victims Board. The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
In a six person majority decision delivered 'by Justice
O'Connor, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions
and invalidated the Son of Sam law, holding that it violated the
First Amendment, and that the statute was not narrowly tailored
to achieve the State's goal of compensating victims from profits of
crime. Justices Blackmun and Kennedy filed opinions concurring
in the judgment. Justice Thomas took no part in the case.
According to the majority, a statute is presumptively violative
of the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speak-
ers because of the content of their speech. The Son of Sam law was
viewed to be such an impermissible content-based statute. The
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Court held that the law singled out profits earned from an expres-
sive activity, a burden the State placed on no other income, and it
was directed solely at works with a particular content. In order to
be consistent with the First Amendment, the identity of the
speaker had to be irrelevant in such a case.
The compelling state interest of preventing criminals from
profiting from their crimes and of compensating the victims of
crime may have been valid, but the Son of Sam statute was seen as
overinclusive and overbroad in its remedial effect. There was little
interest in limiting victim compensation to the proceeds of the
criminal's speech about the crime. And, the statute applied to
works on any subject that expressed an author's thoughts or mem-
ories about his or her crime. This overly broad definition meant
that the author need not be actually accused or convicted of a
crime, but need only mention that a crime was committed in his or
her work. The Court feared that if the statute was permitted to
stand, a broad range of literature (including many classics) would
be subjected to the law's requirements.
Justice Blackmun, in his one paragraph concurrence, stated
that the New York Statute was underinclusive as well as overinclu-
sive. Justice Kennedy's concurrence argued that there was no need
to look at compelling state interests because the Son of Sam stat-
ute could be reversed using solely First Amendment restricted con-
tent of speech analysis.
-C.L.
BANKS v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, No. 91-
1666, U.S. App. LEXIS 25790 (7TH CIR. OCT. 13, 1992).
Braxston Lee Banks played three years of collegiate football at
the University of Notre Dame. Due to knee injuries, he was unable
to play football during portions of his sophomore and junior years.
Fearing that another season of college football might exacerbate
his knee injury and prevent him from playing in the National
Football League (NFL), he sat out his last year of collegiate eligi-
bility and entered the 1990 NFL draft. Unfortunately, Banks failed
to be selected in the draft or as a free agent. In an effort to im-
prove his marketability as a professional football player, Banks re-
turned to the University of Notre Dame to re-enter its football
program and play his last year of collegiate eligibility. The applica-
tion of two National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) eligi-
bility rules, however, barred his participation in college football;
Rule 12.2.4.2, the "no-draft" rule, which provides that an amateur
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